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A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
DEPRECIATION ACCOUNTING — THE
UNITED STATES STEEL EXPERIENCE
Abstract: This paper examines the magnitude of the reporting bias
inherent in the historical cost accounting of a firm's physical
capital. Reported depreciation data pertaining to U.S. Steel Corporation (currently USX) between 1939 and 1987 are compared with
standardized historical cost figures and replacement cost estimates. The findings suggest that replacement cost depreciation
would have provided more information about U.S. Steel's ability to
maintain its productive capacity than historical cost depreciation
did. Thus, this analysis provides an illustration of one of the
primary arguments for replacement cost accounting.

Changing prices have created accounting measurement
problems for business enterprises throughout the twentieth
century. Paton [1922] noted that in periods of sweeping price
changes the accountants' yardstick (money) becomes "an unstable, variable unit; and comparisons of unadjusted accounting
statements prepared at intervals are accordingly always more
or less unsatisfactory and are often positively misleading . . .
When prices on all sides are climbing sharply it seems clear that
a mere increase in the number of dollars possessed is not a valid
expression of true improvement in economic condition" [pp.
427-428]. In such periods, Paton pointed out that management
must be careful not to pursue a dividend policy which threatens
"the preservation and expansion of the physical capital of the
enterprise" [p. 440].
Paton argued that "by reducing what would otherwise be
the net income figure," recognition of replacement cost depreI would like to thank Barbara Merino for her helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this paper and for her professional guidance in general. This paper also
has benefitted from the substantive comments provided by four anonymous
reviewers. Finally, I would like to thank graduate students: Byron Harris,
William Shows, and Alan Pavelec.
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ciation would enforce management's pursuit of a conservative
dividend policy, and "undoubtedly tend to prevent the disbursement of capital as dividends" [p. 440]. Paton concluded
that replacement cost data would allow users to better judge
how successfully management had maintained the existing
physical capital.
Even though debate concerning theoretical aspects of replacement cost measurement persisted, physical capital continued to be maintained largely at historical values in financial
statements. Finally, in 1979, after considerable discussion and
following a period of persistent price increases, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board mandated in SFAS 33 that replacement cost information be disclosed.
Subsequent replacement cost disclosures, however, were
apparently neglected by statement users. Managers [Madison
and Radig, 1983], auditors [Skousen and Albrecht, 1984], and
professional analysts [Berliner, 1983] reported that they did not
utilize SFAS 33 data when they evaluated past economic events
or when they formulated expectations about the future. Recent
capital market research studies confirm these survey findings.
Researchers found little evidence that a relationship existed
between changing price information on a firm level and securities prices [Beaver and Landsman, 1983] or trading volume [Ro,
1981], or that SFAS 33 disclosures could be used to predict
unanticipated dividend changes [Schaefer, 1984 and Murdoch,
1986] or takeover targets [Bartley and Boardman, 1983].
This paper uses an alternative approach to assessing the
usefulness of replacement cost information. It addresses the
questions of (1) whether replacement cost depreciation provides
more information about a company's ability to maintain its
productive capacity than does historical cost depreciation and
(2) whether replacement cost measures enhance a user's capability to perform long-range forecasts and confirm prior expectations.
The annual reports of U.S. Steel Corporation (currently
USX) from 1939 through 1987 are used to investigate how
certain accounting measurement techniques can bias the financial statement presentation of a firm's physical capital. Specifically, two series that summarize past investing activities
are developed. The series are a firm's Net Asset Ratio [(Fixed
Assets — Accumulated Depreciation)/Fixed Assets] and a firm's
Annual Replacement Index [(Capital Additions - Depreciation)/
Beginning Fixed Assets]. These ratios depict the extent to which
a company has been able to maintain its capital base in the past
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/5
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and provide an indication of the firm's long range competitiveness.
Actual reported data are compared with standardized historical cost and replacement cost estimates for U.S. Steel over a
fifty-year period. The comparison highlights the signal differences that can be created by alternative valuation methods.
Conceptual implications of the findings also are discussed.
MODEL
"Destruction is the law of n a t u r e " [Hatfield, 1909, p. 121].
Yet accounting for the depreciation of fixed capital has not
always been so clear cut. In his historical analysis of accounting
evolution, Littleton [1966] reported that one of the earliest
English references to depreciation was found in A Brief Instruction by John Mellis [1588] which suggested a debit entry to the
profit-and-loss account and a corresponding credit entry to the
"Implements to householde" "for so much lost by decay of
household stuff". Similar treatment subsequently was recommended for horses [Stephen Monteage, Debtor and Creditor Made
Easie, 1683] and ships [William Jackson, Book-Keeping in the
True Italian Form, 1801]. The asset account was credited at the
end of a given period for the current value of the asset in
question and any remaining difference needed to close the
account was debited to profit-and-loss. Depreciation apparently
was not regarded as an expense but was created because of
"decay from use" [Littleton, 1966, p. 227].
The systematic recognition of depreciation did not receive
much consideration until manufacturing necessitated the purchase of large quantities of plant and equipment and the growth
of corporations required that a clear distinction be made between capital and revenue so that net profit could be correctly
calculated and capital stock could be protected against impairment from dividends [Littleton, 1966, p. 240]. One of the early
authors to apply depreciation to industry was Ewing Matheson
in a book entitled The Depreciation of Factories [London, 1884].
Since the late 19th century, an argument has persisted
concerning whether depreciation should result from a cost
allocation process or an asset valuation process. The side taken
in this argument can be explained partially by whether one
wishes to focus upon measuring a flow or valuing a stock.
Ladelle [1890], who favored the flow concept, argued that
depreciation should be used to allocate the original cost of an
asset to the various periods that will benefit from the stream of
Published by eGrove, 1989
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services produced by the machine. Depreciation, in this instance, represents the systematic matching of a historical cost
with the revenue that it helps generate [Paton and Littleton,
1940]. Replacement costs are not particularly relevant.
Hotelling [1923], in contrast, employed the stock concept to
develop his model of depreciation. He suggested that the value
of a machine and the value of a unit of its output are interrelated, and historical costs become irrelevant after an asset has
been purchased. According to Hotelling's stock concept, an asset
only has value if it can be used in the future. Thus depreciation
in a given year reflects the periodic change in the current value
of assets that have not yet been sold or discarded [Hicks, 1969].
Replacement costs, in this instance, play an important role in
the measuring process.
The stock concept (and thus replacement cost accounting)
may provide more information than historical costs about a
company's past success in maintaining its productive capacity.
Hotelling [1923] argues that a particular capital asset which
employs old obsolete technology will be replaced by a new
technology machine if management thinks that the present
value of the benefits to be derived from the new technology will
exceed the cost of purchasing such a machine. If the purchase of
new technology cannot be justified economically, however,
production will not immediately cease. Old technology firms
will continue to profitably produce output with the capital in
place as long as the present value of the future net revenues
(sales price minus variable costs) exceeds the present value of
any positive salvage value to be collected at the termination of
the old technology. Variable costs will slowly mount as increasingly more frequent and expensive repairs are required to
keep the old technology assets functional.
When an entire plant contains old technology and new
technology is not implemented, the time between deciding to
terminate old technology operations sometime in the future and
the actual closing of the plant doors can span decades. The only
signal that such a decision has occurred may be a decline in new
capital purchases and a gradual aging in the productive capacity. In this case, replacement costs, not historical costs, provide
the best indication that disinvestment is occurring.
Just such an event occurred in the steel industry in the early
1960s. The influx of foreign imports caused the demand curve
for the domestic steel industry to shift to the left. This decline in
demand (from D0 to D1 in Figure 1) caused many domestic steel
firms to halt preliminary plans to replace their existing capital
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/5
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Figure 1
Domestic Steel Industry Supply Curve

D0
D1
FCo
FCp
TCo
TCp
Qo,Po
Q1,P1

=
=
=
=
=
=

Old demand for steel products before influx of imports
New demand for steel products after influx of imports
Industry fixed costs (old technology)
Industry fixed costs (new technology)
Total costs (old technology)
Total costs (new technology)
=
Quantity and price of domestic steel produced with old technology
before influx of imports
= Quantity and price of domestic steel produced with old technology
after influx of imports

Published by eGrove, 1989

5

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 16 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 5
124

The Accounting

Historians

Journal,

December

1989

stock with new technology at a cost of (FCP), because the present
value of the expected future net revenues to be derived from
these proposed new investments could no longer be expected to
cover the projected initial capital outlays. (See Figure 1.)
CASE DEVELOPMENT
U.S. Steel has been an acknowledged leader in the development of financial reporting. 1 As such, the corporation has
been the focus of historical research. Younkins, Flesher and
Flesher [1984] utilized the U.S. Steel annual reports issued prior
to 1952 to illustrate the historical development of financial
reporting during the first half of the twentieth century. Richard
Vangermeersch [1971, 1988] utilized the corporate reports to
trace the historical development of depreciation and to comment on observed changes in the reporting of tangible fixed
assets.
Because United States Steel Corporation is a domestic
leader in what has historically been considered a very capital
intensive industry, it is also the focus of this study. Throughout
the fifty-year period encompassed by this study, U.S. Steel's net
tangible assets represented, on the average, over 55 percent of
the value of the total reported assets. In such a capital intensive
company, depreciation measurement plays an important role in
income determination.
United States Steel Corporation also provides an excellent
subject for the study of the predictive value of reported physical
capacity and related investment numbers, because the company
underwent significant restructuring in the early 1980s. In 1979,
U.S. Steel began consolidating under-utilized steel production
facilities and permanently shutting down obsolete unprofitable
plants. This action vastly altered the technological structure of
the company. In 1939, 47.8 percent of the revenues generated
from the sale of steel products were used to pay employee
benefits. By 1981, after the initial plant closings, employee
expenditures as a percent of sales had declined to 36.4 percent.
In the ensuing six years, additional restructuring enabled U.S.
Steel to reduce the number of man-hours required to produce
and ship a ton of steel from 10.8 to less than 4.0.
1
See Financial Accounting Milestones in the Annual Reports of United States
Steel Corporation: The First Seven Decades, edited by Richard Vangermeersch,
New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1986, for extracts of various financial
reporting milestones over the period 1902-1968.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/5
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Concomitant with the move to eliminate unprofitable steel
facilities, U.S. Steel began to funnel available resources away
from steel into oil and gas production activities. This change in
strategy resulted in the acquisition of Marathon Oil in 1982, the
purchase of Husky Oil Company in 1984, and the bringing of
Texas Oil and Gas Corporation into the corporate family in
1986.
This case study seeks to identify the point during the fiftyyear span when U.S. Steel's strategic plan of retrenchment in
steel and expansion into a new industry first could be observed.
At what point did it become evident that the company had
compromised its ability to retain its historical share of the
domestic steel market? Did the reported accounting numbers
provide any false or misleading signals of shrinkage or expansion in the company's physical capacity to produce steel?
Measurement of the existing stock (or undepreciated value)
of capital assets provides a means of ascertaining if a company
has decided not to replace existing capital stock. If the bundle of
services embodied in depreciation are not replaced through
capital reinvestment then the bundle of services available for
future periods identified as net assets will decline. In periods of
constant prices, comparison of current capital investments with
systematic historical cost depreciation can be utilized to ascertain whether the stock of depreciable assets is increasing or
depleting. Such will not be the case, however, when prices
change over time. Data that enter the accounting system when
assets are originally purchased lose their economic significance
as prices change. When prices are not constant the average asset
age can only be approximated and disinvestment be uncovered
if all assets with older price references are adjusted to reflect the
latest prices and technologies. Net asset values and current
depreciation must be restated in current prices, which reflect
technological change, to estimate the enormity of the problem
facing a particular firm to modernize.
Three series of accounting numbers pertaining to the valuation and depreciation of plant assets were developed in this
study to examine changes in physical capacity. The first
economic series contains actual reported financial data. Information pertaining to U.S. Steel's periodic recognition of expired
capital costs in the form of depreciation, as well as information
about their annual physical capital acquisitions and disposals,
were collected from the annual reports generated by the management of U.S. Steel. Specific segment data derived from the
10-K reports filed with the Securities and Exchange CommisPublished by eGrove, 1989
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sion were utilized to remove oil and gas capital activities where
necessary after 1983.
A second economic series eliminated variations in the reported data created by U.S. Steel utilizing different depreciation
policies at different points in time. In this series, all assets were
valued at historical cost and were assumed to lose their full
economic value over a fifteen-year period. 2 Depreciation was
assumed to be a linear function of time and was recorded on a
straight-line basis.
The beginning balance, on January 1, 1939, in Accumulated
Depreciation of $1 billion was revised u p w a r d $796 million to
reflect the impact of the utilization of a similar fifteen-year life
assumption on past depreciation recognition. 3 The net undepreciated balance of $548 million was amortized for case study
purposes over the ensuing fourteen years using a sum-of-theyears-digits method. 4 All subsequent purchases of capital assets
were assumed to possess a useful economic life of fifteen years.
The above assumptions enable uniform depreciation to be
recognized on all plant assets acquired by U.S. Steel throughout
the entire fifty-year period of the study.
The third economic series generated for this study depicts
the impact of increasing replacement costs on U.S. Steel's
physical capital investment policies. Historical cost depreciation and net plant assets balances valued in historical costs do
not adequately reflect the long-term effect of increasing construction costs on the ability of a company to maintain a certain
2
A fifteen-year economic life coincided with the actual replacement cost
observed in the Japanese steel industry after World War II and roughly
corresponded to the apparent shutdown policy employed by U.S. Steel in the
early eighties. If the assumption is made that plant assets become obsolete and
are discarded on a first-in-first-out basis, the oldest assets that continued to be
operational after the last plant closings were finalized in 1987, must have been
purchased no earlier than mid-1969 and thus were less than twenty years old.
3
Average capital additions during the initial five-year period of the study
(1939-1944) totaled $78,250 per year. If additions of a similar magnitude had
occurred with similar frequency in the years preceding the start of the period
under investigation, it would have taken approximately thirty years to accumulate the gross Fixed Asset balance at January 1, 1939 of $2.3 billion. Based
on this assumption and again utilizing a fifteen-year useful economic life,
sixteen years of capital additions averaging $78,250 would have been fully
depreciated by January 1, 1939, and fourteen years of similar acquisitions would
have been partially depreciated.
4
This amortization reflects the results of the assumption that identical
capital additions had been made in each of the years prior to the start of the
study and that all capital assets are completely depreciated over a fifteen-year
period using a straight-line method.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/5
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level of service potential. In a given year, net service potential
embodied in current plant additions may not completely replace the service potential consumed through production activities. Yet, because prices have steadily increased over time,
the dollars paid for plant additions may greatly exceed the
dollar valuation assigned to historical cost depreciation.
To standardize the dollar value assigned to undepreciated
plant capacity, all historical costs utilized in the second
economic series were restated to reflect current replacement
costs. Historical acquisition costs were revised annually to
reflect current replacement costs in a given year. An externally
generated specific price index was used to perform the conversion as follows:
R e p l a c e m e n t Cost
Historical
Current Index
in Year t + n
Cost of
in Year t + n
=
Acquisition i
x
of A c q u i s i t i o n i
Purchased in Year t
Purchased in Year t
Historical Index
in Year t

The ENGINEERING NEWS-RECORD (ENR) construction
cost index was utilized to convert historical cost dollars to
replacement cost dollars. The ENR construction cost index was
created in 1921 to diagnose price changes that occurred during
and immediately following World War I and to evaluate their
effect on construction costs. The index, which is composed of
constant quantities of structural steel, portland cement, lumber,
and common labor, is designed to measure the effects of wage
rate and materials price trends.
The ENR construction cost index was selected over the
producer's price index (PPI) for three reasons. (1) The PPI does
not include labor, which is a vital part of the construction
business. (2) The PPI includes many items such as food which
are unrelated to the construction business. (3) The ENR construction cost index is less volatile and better reflects changes in
capital spending. Table 1 contains a s u m m a r y of the ENR
construction cost index for the years 1939 through 1987.
COMPARISON OF DEPRECIATION RECOGNITION
Actual Reported

Depreciation

One of the goals of depreciation accounting is to distribute
the cost of a capital asset over the estimated period that the unit
will provide economic usefulness to the firm so that the periodic
expiration is systematically and rationally matched against the
Published by eGrove, 1989
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Table 1
Engineering News Record Construction Cost Index
1939-1987
Index Range
Years

From

To

Average
Annual Change

1939-1947
1948-1957
1958-1967
1968-1977
1978-1987

236
413
724
1070
2577

413
724
1070
2577
4401

9.37%
7.53%
4.78%
14.08%
7.08%

periodic revenue generated by the asset. Physical factors such as
wear and tear from operation, the action of time and other
elements, and deterioration and decay, as well as functional
factors such as obsolescence and supersession, place limits on
the economic usefulness of an operational asset and ideally will
be reflected in the periodic apportionment of asset cost.
Table 2 summarizes the various methods employed by U.S.
Steel to record depreciation expense throughout the fifty-year
period.
Examination of the various depreciation policies followed
by U.S. Steel over the past fifty years suggest that the vagarities
of the current income tax law, not changes in plant capacity
utilization, governed the periodic corporate recognition of
depreciation. 5 Emergency facilities constructed during World
War II and the Korean Conflict costing $186,544,000 and
$812,854,000, respectively, were rapidly amortized over fiveyear periods. Later, in 1962, the IRS Revenue Procedure 62-21
allowed U.S. Steel to inaugurate the use of an accelerated
method of recognizing depreciation on its assets for tax purposes. Management decided "after careful study of the new
procedure as applied to its own properties", to base "its determination of the wear and exhaustion of facilities on the
guideline procedure" [U.S. Steel, 1962, p. 5]. This move increased depreciation which reduced accounting profits available for distribution as dividends. The 20 percent double-thedeclining-balance method was utilized for the next six years.
5
Vangermeersch [1971, p.70] came to the same conclusion. He noted, "As tax
accounting depreciation methods and the replacement-cost and accelerated
methods became the financial accounting depreciation methods for U.S. Steel,
the yearly depreciation amount became more and more the result of an
arbitrary and inflexible formula geared not to production but to tax and other
considerations."

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/5
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415,003

346,107

2,190,838

1,961,700

533,700

3,112,900

4,555,300

1948-1950

1951-1952

1953-1961

1962-1967

1968-1969

1970-1978

1979-1987

2.9%
5.1%

Description
Straight-line (SL) Depreciation
SL Depreciation plus amortization of emergency facilities
totaling $186,544,000

SL Depreciation
4.5%
SL Depreciation plus $26,300,000 extra which represents 30% of
original cost (Attempt to reflect replacement cost)
138,334
4.8%
SL Depreciation plus annual accelerated amount of 10% of cost
when purchased and 10% in succeeding year (Total extra =
$112,899,000)
173,053
5.2%
SL Depreciation plus annual accelerated amount ($62,004,000)
plus amortization of emergency facilities certified by Defense
Production Administration as essential at 20% per year
($59,014,000)
243,426
4.9%
SL Depreciation plus amortization of emergency facilities
($753,840,000)
326,950
4.7% 20% Double Declining Balance under IRS Revenue Procedure
62-21 plus 7% investment tax credit ($101,500,000)
276,850
3.3%
SL Depreciation with revised asset lives Buildings 40 yrs.;
Machinery 18 yrs., Mining 10.5 yrs., and Chemical 11 yrs. plus
7% investment tax credit ($73,900,000)
345,878
3.3%
SL Depreciation adjusted downward in some years due to lower
operations
506,144
3.7%
SL Depreciation adjusted for level of production. Minimum of 80%
at capacity =£ 50%; 100% at capacity of 85%; 130% maximum at
capacity of 100%. Depreciable lives changed to 15 yrs. - Machinery; 9.5 yrs. - Chemicals; and 10 yrs. - Mining.

71,401 3.0%
114,462

136,015 $ 68,007
608,451
121,690

1946
71,401
1947 114,462

$

Depreciation
% of Beg.
Fixed Assets

Reed: A Historical

1939-1940
1941-1945

Depreciation

Table 2
Summary of Depreciation Expense Recorded by U.S. Steel 1939-1987
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In 1968, "to enhance the comparability of financial statements in the steel industry" [U.S. Steel, 1968, p. 4], U.S. Steel
revised the lives of certain properties and returned to a
straight-line method of recording depreciation. Current tax law
again played a role in the magnitude of the periodic charge. The
midpoint lives provided by the IRS Asset Depreciation Range
System served as the range over which depreciation was to be
recognized for a particular asset. Depreciable lives remained
unchanged until 1979 when most were reduced. This revision of
economic lives, however, could be labeled, "Too little, too late."
In the fourth quarter of 1979, U.S. Steel announced the permanent shutdown of several steel and nonsteel plants and wrote
down depreciable assets a total of $218.7 million to their
estimated recoverable value. Sales revenues from these operations amounted to only about 5 percent of total sales, but the
plant closings impacted more than 11,000 employees.
The 1979 downward adjustment was followed by four
similar announcements over the next seven years. In 1981,
management suggested that the facility shutdowns were only
temporary, and were caused by " a recession compounded by
excessive steel imports" [U.S. Steel, 1981, p. 3].
However, by 1982, the production suspensions were no
longer considered temporary. Management blamed "sagging
d e m a n d " and a company desire to "reduce costs and improve
operating efficiencies, quality control and customer service" for
the realignment of and curtailment of a n u m b e r of plants [U.S.
Steel, 1982, p. 4]. The next series of plant shutdowns occurred in
1983. Management reported, "In December we moved to preserve the best and most modern of our tools of production, to
close or downsize certain operations and to consolidate others.
And we struck a balance between products for the capital goods
market and those for consumer-oriented markets, shifting our
emphasis to flat rolled steels for automobiles and appliances,
seamless pipe for the oil and gas industries and heavy plates and
beams for construction" [U.S. Steel, 1983, p. 2].
In 1987, at the end of a six-month strike, U.S. Steel announced that it would not restart most of the facilities at
Baytown, Texas and Provo, Utah. "We are not giving up any
capacity to put product in the marketplace from where we were
before the strike" [Wall Street Journal, February 5, 1987, p. 4].
The total recognition of the presence of obsolete, worn out,
and unneeded physical capacity ultimately amounted to $1,347
billion dollars. This succession of chargeoffs eliminated over 10
percent of the gross carrying value of the physical assets rehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/5
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ported at the beginning of 1979 and reduced capacity almost 50
percent.
Statement users were forewarned that problems were
mounting. Throughout the forty-year period leading up to the
series of write-downs, U.S. Steel management persistently admonished readers in the annual reports that allowable depreciation charges were inadequate, effective tax rates too high, and
that company resources were simply not available to maintain a
modern physical plant. (See Appendix 1 for excerpts of management comments).
U.S. Steel's accompanying financial statements, however,
provided inadequate numerical signals of the extent to which
obsolescence was eroding their physical capital base. Comparison of annual capital additions with the concurrent depreciation
charges, graphically depicted in Figure 2, might erroneously
suggest that U.S. Steel maintained an expanding productive
capital posture throughout the post World War II era. Apparent
declines in productive capacity were only portrayed in periods
when emergency facilities were being amortized (1941-1945 and
1954-1956) or in the initial stages of the recognition of accelerated depreciation (1962-1965).
By 1967, the accounting numbers suggested that the company had begun to rapidly expand its productive capacity.
Three years later management sought to confirm this image
with the following comments:
"Although it will be another year or two before
some major units are fully operational, almost every
area of our steel operations has now been substantially upgraded . . . Our job now is to obtain the volume required to utilize the full productive capabilities of all our facilities by participating fully in the
growing markets for steel" [U.S. Steel, 1970, p. 2].
However, closer analysis of Figure 2 shows that the shift in
the reported accounting numbers was due, in part, to the change
in depreciation methods. In 1968, the straight-line method
reduced depreciation charges by $94.0 million. 6 If the losses
associated with the plant closures are ignored, U.S. Steel expended almost twice as many funds for plant additions ($11.2
billion) as they expensed as depreciation ($5.8 billion) during
the sixteen-year period that followed the change in depreciation
methods.
6

No cumulative catchup adjustment was shown on the income statement.
APB # 2 0 which would have required disclosure was not implement until 1971.
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Figure 2
Capital Additions minus Depreciation
Actual Reported Numbers
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Not only did U.S. Steel extend the useful life of its assets,
but throughout the 1970s, the company also periodically recognized depreciation that was below the amount which would
have been required had production been maintained at the
presumed ideal level of 85 percent of capacity. The company's
depreciation policy assumed that physical factors such as wear
and tear resulting from the operation of the assets, should be the
major limiting factor in determining depreciation. In reality,
economic factors such as technological obsolescence might have
provided a better prediction of the rate at which an asset was
losing its service potential.
U.S. Steel's financial statements did not reflect the contraction and retrenchment that were occurring in plant capacity
until 1984 after the bulk of the plant closings had been consummated. At that time, plant additions declined drastically and
remained insignificant thereafter. (See Appendix 2 for a brief
discussion of the factors cited by U.S. Steel as causing the
company's loss of its historical share of the global steel market.)
Historical Cost — Uniform Useful Economic

Life

Assumption

Existing plant assets will become outmoded as improved,
more efficient machines or processes become available. To
remain competitive, a company must constantly replace old
physical assets with new technologies, well before the replaced
assets reach the end of their physical lives. In a highly industrialized, technology-oriented economy, technological impairment will be steady and very persistent. The systematic periodic
recognition of a uniform amount of depreciation regardless of
the actual physical decline that an asset might actually suffer
offers an indication of the process by which a company's plant
capacity becomes outmoded.
Table 3 compares actual depreciation with standardized
depreciation to show the effect of a uniform depreciation policy.
It gives some indication of the bias generated when either the
depreciation method or useful life assumption is altered. The
impact on the financial statements of not maintaining a consistent depreciation policy is graphically presented in Figure 3,
which depicts the cumulative difference between recorded depreciation plus the actual write-offs and depreciation charges
based on a fifteen-year life straight-line assumption.
From the outbreak of World War II through 1957, U.S. Steel
appears to have recognized excess depreciation charges (compared to the standardized series) in the financial statements.
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Table 3
Comparison of Actual Depreciation
With a Fifteen-Year Life Assumption
Straight-Line Depreciation
Actual Over< Under>
Standardized
Years

Reported
Depreciation

Fifteen-Year
Assumption

1939-1947
1948-1957
1958-1967
1968-1977
1978-1987

$ 930,329
2,119,816
2,793,832
3,199,500
6,369,600*

$ 716,157
1,685,872
3,264,519
4,437,863
6,505,999

Period
$

214,172
433,944
( 470,687)
( 1,238,363)
(
136,399)

Cumulative
$

214,172
648,116
177,429
( 1,060,934)
( 1,197,333)

* Includes major write-offs

During this period the company utilized various accelerated
methods to amortize the emergency facilities constructed for
World War II and the Korean Conflict. From 1963 through 1967,
financial statement recognition of a 7 percent investment tax
credit and the 20 percent double-declining-balance depreciation
allowed under IRS Revenue Procedure 61-21 caused reported
depreciation and standardized depreciation to be quite similar.
(The five-year difference was only $31,138,000.) In 1968, however, U.S. Steel returned to reporting straight-line depreciation;
thereafter, the company consistently underestimated depreciation expense. By 1978, just prior to the initial announcement of a
m a j o r plant closing, cumulative underestimates exceeded $1
billion. From 1979 through the end of the study in 1987, asset
write-downs and reported depreciation roughly equaled estimated straight-line fifteen-year estimated depreciation, but individual years were markedly different.
Replacement

Cost — Uniform Useful Life

Assumption

The final economic series utilized to depict depreciation
expense not only assumes that all property, plant, and equipment is depreciated over a uniform fifteen-year life, but further
standardizes the write-off of the service potential inherent in
such assets by restating historical costs to replacement costs.
The revision of property, plant, and equipment to reflect the
estimated costs that would be incurred if assets with similar
service potential were purchased at current prices, allows the
reader to more accurately estimate any remaining productive
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/5
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Figure 3
Cumulative Difference Between Actual Depreciation
plus Writeoffs and Straight-line (15 yr. Assumption)
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capacity, because fully depreciated assets (formerly reported at
low historical costs) are weighted identically after restatement
to recent purchases (at higher prices) of productive assets. 7
Table 4 summarizes historical cost fifteen-year life assumption
depreciation expense restated in current prices (regular depreciation) and current year changes in replacement costs of
previously depreciated service potential (catchup depreciation).
Table 4
Summary of Replacement Cost Depreciation
Replacement Cost Depreciation
Years
1939-1947
1948-1957
1958-1967
1968-1977
1978-1987

Regular

Catchup

2,423,510
4,381,298
7,199,059
10,969,516

$ 958,985
3,121,072
3,720,838
15,071,021
14,633,148

Catchup as
Percentage of
Regular Depreciation
$ 1,886,052
196.7%

128.8%
84.9%
209.3%
133.4%

Old (totally depreciated) assets will require the recognition
of significant amounts of catchup depreciation, particularly in
periods of increasing costs, as evidenced in this case by increases
in the ENR Construction Cost Index. Estimates of such changes
in the probable future sacrifices, which would be required to
replenish current operating capacity of fully depreciated assets,
are not readily available when such assets are only measured in
the original prices incurred to construct the assets. These
valuation problems become more pronounced as assets age and
the percentage of fully depreciated capacity becomes significant
relative to total capacity.
From 1968 when U.S. Steel began utilizing straight-line
depreciation through 1983 when the fourth round of permanent
plant shutdowns was consummated, annual catchp depreciation was, on the average, twice as large (201.5%) as regular
replacement cost depreciation. After this point in time, annual
catchup depreciation dropped dramatically in importance to be
considerably smaller (28.5%) than regular depreciation. These
numbers offer a striking contrast to the image of a rapidly
expanding physical capacity as depicted in the historical cost
depreciation series. Between 1968 and 1983, U.S. Steel reported
that capital additions were $4,240 million in excess of actual
recorded historical cost depreciation (see Figure 2 and Table 2).
7

See Appendix 1 for further explanation.
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When asset life is held constant, only changes in the
amounts needed to replace productive capacity will cause replacement cost depreciation to differ from historical cost depreciation. Figure 4, which graphically overlays the ENR Construction Cost Index on the annual restatement of depreciation in
current costs, portrays the impact of changing construction
costs on depreciation recognition.
In general, changes in construction costs varied directly
with the variance in replacement cost and historical cost depreciation under a fifteen-year asset life assumption. Two significant increases in the costs of construction — one immediately
following the end of World War II and the second during the
build-up and fighting in Vietnam — were followed in the
subsequent years by a widening of the gap between replacement
cost and historical cost depreciation. In the years between
World War II and Vietnam, the steel industry experienced
relatively small changes in the cost of construction. In particular, the U.S. Steel fixed asset accounts reflected few changes in
depreciation expense restated for the fifteen-year life assumption. The two series converged only during one period. In 1972,
spiraling construction costs began to abate. Yet replacement
cost depreciation as a percentage of historical cost depreciation
continued to widen for ten years. This ratio only began to
improve in 1984, when construction cost changes began a sharp
decline.
Which method of recording depreciation best reflects
changes that have occurred in current productive capacity? The
impact of the three alternative methods of valuing depreciation
are discussed in the next section to highlight the effectiveness of
each in linking capital values to prediction of future cash flows.
COMPARISON OF REPORTED INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Iron Age [January 30, 1964] asked the following question:
"Is the steel industry being too cautious in its capital speeding?"
They answered their own question by saying: "Steel spending is
high. But it still just about equals depreciation." From 1939
through 1987, U.S. Steel recorded a five-fold increase in the
value of its capital assets and capital additions were approximately $4 billion more than depreciation changes. This would
suggest that U.S. Steel had been able to expand its productive
capacity. Yet capacity during this same period declined from a
reported high in 1959 of 41.9 million to 19.2 million tons in 1987.
Was the decline in physical capacity as a b r u p t as historical cost
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Figure 4
Comparison Of Change In ENR Construction Cost Index With
CC Depreciation/HC Depreciation (15 yr.)1

1
Left axis applies to change in ENR construction cost index and right axis
applies to change in CC/HC depreciation.
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figures would suggest, or did a gradual aging process occur?
Which depreciation valuation method provides the clearest
signals that productive capacity was being eroded? Figure 5
pictorially compares Annual Replacement Indexes measured in
historical costs with those calculated with replacement costs.
Figure 5
Annual Replacement Indexes
1939-1987
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From the end of World War II until 1983 when U.S. Steel was
involved extensively in the plant shutdown program, the reported historical cost numbers presented a persistent pattern of
annual new capital expenditures being well in excess of the
annual recognition of facility wear and tear. Only for two short
periods (1954-1955 and 1962-1964) did capital additions fail to
exceed depreciation charges. The first disruption of apparent
steady expansion occurred immediately following the Korean
War after an extensive program of modernization and expansion
was completed. Tax savings, precipitated by the accelerated
write-off of these emergency facilities, aided in the financing of
the construction.
The years 1963 through 1965 marked the second period when
construction expenditures did not outpace historical cost depreciation. Shifts in demand from heavy to light products were
occurring, and domestic steel producers were starting to feel
pressure from foreign imports. During this period, new facilities
authorizations began to reflect a change in emphasis at U.S. Steel
toward light, flat rolled steels. This shift culminated in August,
1965, when an enlarged $1.8 billion facilities program was
announced. For the next seventeen years capital expenditures
completely outpaced recognition of wear and tear. Yet productive capacity declined from approximately 42 to 31 million tons.
The Annual Replacement Indexes revalued in current replacement costs provide a different picture of capacity expansion
and contraction at U.S. Steel. With historical costs, capacity
expansion did not appear to cease until 1983. In contrast, a bleak
picture begins to emerge as early as 1961 when replacement costs
are utilized. Thereafter, current capital expenditures are greater
than depreciation charges, valued also in current costs, only in
1967-1969 and again briefly in 1976.
Comparison of the reported historical cost Net Asset Ratios
with the replacement cost Net Asset Ratios (Figure 6) provides
confirmatory evidence of the signal differences obtained from the
two economic series. Undepreciated assets as a percentage of
total assets give some indication of the age of the physical plant.
Again historical costs ratios offer a much more positive image of
the company's ability to maintain physical capacity over the
years than does the alternative measure. Historical cost d a t a
suggest that U.S. Steel was able to modernize the plant between
1965 and 1980 (Net Asset Ratios increased from 37.7 to 46.3).
Using replacement costs, one could at best only infer that U.S.
Steel was holding its own. (The ratio declined slightly from 21.1
to 20.1). In 1983, historical cost Net Asset Ratios abruptly began
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol16/iss2/5
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deteriorating from a high of 46.5 to 32.7 in 1987. Such rapid
swings are not observed in the replacement cost numbers for this
period. (Comparable Net Asset Ratios were 25.6 and 25.8,
respectively.)
Figure 6
Net Asset Ratios
1939-1987
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Figures 7 and 8 provide additional information pertaining
to the annual changes in the reported historical cost and
replacement cost Net Asset Ratios.
Figure 7
Annual Change in Net Fixed Assets/Gross Fixed Assets
Historical Cost — Actual Depreciation
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Figure 8
Annual Change in Net Fixed Assets/Gross Fixed Assets
Replacement Cost — 15 yr. Assumption
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Net Asset Ratios calculated with reported financial statement numbers suggested that U.S. Steel experienced from time
to time fairly large changes in the average age of the physical
plant. Significant ratio declines occurred twice — once during
World War II and then again during the Korean Conflict —
before the plant shutdowns commenced in the 1980s. The early
"plant agings" simply reflected changes in the company's depreciation policy. The latter decline arose because previously
underdepreciated assets were being abandoned. When replacement costs were utilized to develop the Net Asset Ratios, similar
large negative shifts did not arise. Asset aging, particularly for
the two decades beginning in 1960, appeared to be more gradual
and more persistent.
One profitability measure — Return on Net Fixed Assets —
was calculated to provide some indication of the bias inherent in
the reported financial statements concerning management's
effectiveness in using company plant assets to generate net
income. Figure 9 contrasts U.S. Steel's reported historical cost
return on investment with indexes computed on a replacement
cost basis.
Historical cost indexes paint quite a different picture of
long-term company performance than do numbers adjusted for
replacement costs. U.S. Steel's reported financial statements
created an illusion of prosperity. The company's " m a i n t e n a n c e "
investment policy maximized short-term profits; but, by the end
of the period, U.S. Steel had completely lost its competitive
advantage. The existing financial reporting system encouraged
this orderly liquidation.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examined the extant accounting practices for
depreciation over a fifty-year span as conveyed through the
financial statements of one company — U.S. Steel. Several
conclusions, which deal in general with the accounting for
depreciation and specifically with the information communicated by U.S. Steel, are offered.
General

Conclusions:

1) Altering the accounting techniques used to convey information about an economic series can alter the picture conveyed
to the statement user.
2) When prices are changing and/or new technology emerges,
the use of replacement cost numbers to value current services
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Figure 9
Return On Investment
1939-1987

Published by eGrove, 1989

27

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 16 [1989], Iss. 2, Art. 5
146

The Accounting

Historians

Journal,

December

1989

obtained from property, plant and equipment and to estimate any remaining future service potential will more
rapidly convey subtle changes in productive physical capacity and more accurately predict f u t u r e r e d u c t i o n s in
acknowledged physical capacity.
Specific Conclusions

Relating to U.S. Steel:

1) In the past fifty years, recorded depreciation has not resulted
entirely from a cost allocation process whereby the cost of an
asset was systematically allocated to the periods during
which it would be used. Economic factors not related to
matching revenues with related expenses had a significant
impact on the annual depreciation charge recorded by U.S.
Steel.
2) Current tax law, not changes in plant capacity utilization or
concern with matching the periodic expiration of physical
plant service potential with the periodic revenue generated
by the company assets, governed the corporate recognition of
depreciation.
3) Depreciation can be standardized so that the original cost is
systematically allocated over a predetermined number of
periods. Yet changing prices, particularly those incurred for
the construction or purchase of long-lived assets, cause
allocations of past costs to be poor predictors of future cash
inflows from the sale of goods or future cash outflows for the
purchase of new technology.
4) Recognition of the cost of replacing productive assets in the
cost allocation process, provides the clearest signal of
gradual changes which are occurring in a company's ability
to maintain or even enhance its physical capacity to produce
future goods or services.
5) Examination of replacement cost numbers suggest that U.S.
Steel made a decision about 1960 to not commit itself to a
total conversion or recapitalization in the technology newly
emerging at that time. Current and anticipated resources
simply were not available. U.S. Steel alternatively initiated a
smaller, and thus less risky, program of partial conversion to
the new technology. Concurrently, the old technology plants
continued to profitably produce output (at least in historical
cost terms) with the capital in place. Variable costs (particularly labor) gradually increased over time without a
concomitant improvement in output per man-hour. Finally,
two decades later, the price of the output being created with
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the old technology could not offset current cash outlays for
variable costs and U.S. Steel could no longer economically
justify maintaining operations. In 1978, U.S. Steel initiated a
program which ultimately resulted in the permanent closing
of almost 50 percent of its reported capacity.
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1985) defines a
language as being any "systematic means of communicating
ideas or feelings by the use of conventionalized signs, sounds,
gestures, or marks having understood meanings." Accounting
represents a language whereby ideas are conveyed with numbers. U.S. Steel, through its annual financial statements, imparted information to its statement users both with numbers (in
the actual financial statements) and with words (in the management comments attached to the financial statements). One
conveyed a message of ongoing prosperity. The other conveyed a
message of impending doom. The negative message ultimately
proved to be the correct one. Yet there is little indication that it
was heeded by those who could have altered the path that U.S.
Steel followed.
The experiences of U.S. Steel bring three questions to mind.
Was the verbal message repeatedly given by company management ignored because the accounting message being transmitted offered too different a picture? Could the accounting
message have been couched in different terms which would have
added emphasis to U.S. Steel management's verbal warnings?
Are other similar warnings going unheeded today because
historical cost numbers simply do not accurately reflect the
underlying economic events? Additional research into this area
certainly seems advisable.
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APPENDIX 1
Excerpts from Annual Reports of U.S. Steel
1939 — "[Depreciation and depletion of property is an inescapable cost element in production and, unless an adequate sum can be currently set
aside to cover these unseen costs, the corporation might at some future
time find that its facilities had been worn out or depleted and that
provision for their replacement has not been made" [p. 12].
1947 — "It is a simple fact that to buy similar tools of production takes many
more dollars today than formerly; to count as profits, rather than as
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cost, the added sums required merely to sustain production is to
retreat from reality into self-deception" [p. 14].
1954 — "Depreciation amounts as ordinarily calculated and recognized in tax
laws . . . have failed to perform their vital revolving-fund function of
maintaining the supply and modernness of the tools of production. The
reason for this: The total number of dollars that can be recovered in
depreciation over the life of a given facility is limited to the number of
dollars originally expended for the facility. But the buying power of the
dollar has not remained at all stable . . . If depreciation cost is understated in current buying power, then income is correspondingly overstated . . . This is unfair and unfortunate because it results in the
taxation of capital" [pp. 23-24].
1956 — "[The current Federal taxation system] may be regarded as the hidden
taxation of capital as it turns over through depreciation or, alternatively, as a hidden increase in the tax rate on true income . . . The
prospect is that the portion of reported income that must be regarded
as "phantom" income, because it is required to maintain the business
under conditions of continuing inflation, will increase . . . As basic
costs continue to be forced upward, and as the depreciation deficiency
widens, management's problem of finding the dollars required to
maintain the business becomes more acute" [pp. 27-28].
1960 — "The part that government can constructively play in promoting the
growth process is strictly limited, but the part it can play in preventing
growth is virtually unlimited . . . [The government's] tax and regulatory powers can be used to destory utterly the incentive and ability to
save and productively invest that are essential to growth. [Under the
current tax code, the calculation of depreciation] must be based on the
prices paid years ago — twenty-five years or more in the case of U.S.
Steel . . . The deficiency amount which should realistically be regarded
as depreciation is thus treated as income and on that pretense over half
of it is taxed away. This is more than inimical to growth; it puts a tax
on just staying even" [pp. 26-28].
1966 — "Capital is, in a word, tools — everything invested to further production . . . Facility modernization and product innovations blur, even
obliterate, the line of distinction between replacement and expansion
of capacity . . . The financing of replacement should be covered by
adequate depreciation . . . There is thus need for realistic depreciation
allowances, geared to both the acceleration of obsolescence and to the
inflationary erosion of the dollar" [pp. 33-38].
1969 — "The current tax formula is based on charges for depreciation of
dollars invested in the past. But because of inflation, these dollars have
less buying power today, and thus the depreciation allowed is too
small even to maintain existing investment . . . As the widening gap
between return of capital needed and that allowed is taxed as profits,
the real tax rate rises and the incentive to invest falls" [pp. 37-38].
1976 — "Because of the long lives over which our investment in facilities is
required to be recovered, inflation exacts a heavy toll. The purchasing
power of the dollars recovered through depreciation, therefore, is but a
fraction of the amount actually needed to replace the equipment" [p. 5].
1980 — "Present tax laws limit depreciation to the original cost of facilities . . .
[This] means that only part of the cost of replacing worn out facilities
can be recovered as a cost of doing business . . . Confiscation of private
property was never contemplated by Congress. Yet, confiscation is
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occurring at an accelerated pace. Inflation, when combined with our
existing tax laws, is the cause. Tax reform to alleviate the effects of
inflation — through faster write-off of plant and equipment — is no
longer simply desirable, it is imperative" [pp. 33-34],

APPENDIX 2
Discussion of Factors Cited by U.S. Steel
U.S. Steel cited three factors, beyond the Federal tax policy, as exacerbating their ability to retain their historical share of the global steel market. The
company faced intense pressures internally from labor and the Federal government and externally from foreign steel producers. Management suggested
that these pressures ultimately played an important role in U.S. Steel's decision to reduce its steel-making operations.
Union Pressure
U.S. Steel experienced persistent union pressure for increased wages and
benefits. During the 1950s, a cycle of union demands which were not subject to
"dickering or compromise," strikes, and compromises brought successively
larger wage increases, insurance and pension benefits, vacation pay and automatic cost of living adjustments to the worker.
In 1956 the Company noted, "For the best part of two decades, U.S. Steel's
employment cost per employee hour . . . [has] advanced at a rate, compounded
annually, averaging 8.1% . . . [T]he vast power of industry-wide labor unions in
compelling annual increases in employment costs far beyond increases in
productivity is automatically compelling inflation" [p. 25]. And, in 1959, "The
long-term increase in output/man-hour (since 1940) has been equivalent to only
a little over 2% per annum" [p. 29].
Even though the frequency of extended work stoppages declined in the
subsequent years, wages continued to rise, but productivity did not improve.
U.S. Steel warned in 1979.
"Labor cost must be competitive. Higher labor rates can be justified only if
that labor is more productive and can provide a product or service which
is competitive . . . No nation or company can long survive if the price and
productivity of its labor is noncompetitive . . . Since the early seventies,
there has been little productivity improvement in steel . . . For the coming
decade, it is quite clear that collective bargaining improvements must be
earned by improved productivity" [p. 14].
And again in 1982.
"The only alternative to the permanent loss of both steel mills and
steelworker jobs was a moderation in labor costs to bring them more into
line with those of other manufacturing workers" [p. 3].
The escalation in hourly wage costs did not subside until 1983 after steel
plants had begun to be permanently idled. In 1982, the average hourly wage of
steelworkers was $21.61, which represented a 1,579 percent increase over the
1945 average hourly wage of $1,287. The Consumer Price Index during this
same period increased only 436 percent.
A significant wage reduction was finally achieved in 1986, after steel plants
had been idled by a six-month strike.
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"We were determined to get a competitive labor settlement which would
give our steel business a fighting chance to survive in a tough marketplace.
Although we had to endure a six-month strike, we attained our objective"
[p. 4].
Government Pressure
Throughout the fifty years of the study, the Federal government also
applied extensive pressure on U.S. Steel; first, to hold down prices, and later,
to comply with environmental standards. Several company comments relating
to government pressure follow.
Price Controls:
1945 — "Price controls in peacetime is a simple denial to customers of
their right to bring about and to support production of the goods
and services they want . . . Price and cost changes that significantly
narrow profit margins inevitably repel investment and employment in additional production" [p. 24].
1952 — "[Since the start of World War II, one of the] principal devices
employed to undermine the profit incentive has been the virtually
continuous direct or indirect imposition of ceilings on steel product prices during a period when Federal fiscal and monetary
policies were debasing the buying power of everybody's dollars"
[p. 24].
1958 — "He who would squeeze income reinvested to increase wages, taxes
or other costs, or to reduce prices, would be squeezing out . . . the
most immediate and direct means that exists of financing and
expanding industrial capacity, important in peacetime and essential in wartime" [p. 29].
1964 — "Steel prices are virtually the same as six years earlier" [p. 5].
1973 — "On January 25, 1974, the Cost of Living Council granted what was
for U.S. Steel a very nominal increase in pricing authority on steel
products against the substantial cost increase incurred since 1972"
[p. 2].
Environmental Regulations:
1973 — "We believe the time has come when environmentalists at all
levels must carefully weigh the full costs of further pollution
abatement against the probable benefits, particularly where elimination of the final insignificant percentage of contaminants may be
several times as costly and use many times as much energy as
eliminating the first 99%" [p. 16].
1975 — "In today's climate, some governmental regulations are so restrictive and so costly to apply that it may be impossible to add the
needed new capacity and thus provide additional job opportunities
. . . It is not technologically or economically feasible to operate
many facilities for the production of steel . . . with no emissions"
[p. 6].
1977 — "A factor significantly restricting the Corporation's ability to invest in job-producing tools for the future is the mounting pressure
for retrofitting of older facilities with sophisticated and highly
expensive environmental control facilities . . . The economics of
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[capital investments to comply with the implementation of environmental laws] may, at the time they are to be made, dictate
that certain facilities be abandoned instead of modified to comply
with the requirements" [p. 21].
In 1979, the company noted that it had invested $2.1 billion in the past five
years in investments to reduce steelworking costs and $.6 billion for nonincome
producing environmental facilities.
Foreign Pressure
In the late 1950s, U.S. Steel began to experience pressure from abroad as
well as at home, as foreign steel at extremely competitive prices began to enter
the country. At its peak, in 1984, imports comprised 26.4 percent of the
domestic market.
Company management described this problem in the following ways.
1959 — "There is increasing competition from other steel producers, both
in the U.S. and in foreign countries, from other materials such as
aluminum and plastics, and from technological advances which
affect materials requirements throughout industry" [pp. 11-12].
1961 —"Foreign producers with recreated modern capacities are increasingly able to compete with American producers in international
markets . . . America is costing itself out of foreign markets, and
out of the jobs of producing for them, while foreign producers are
invading our domestic markets . . . [If] the cost inflation remains
unhalted, it seems quite clear that we will not be able to balance
what we buy or give abroad with what we sell or get from abroad"
[p. 29].
1964 — "For the first six decades of the 20th century, the U.S. economy
was an exporter of steel mill products. Starting in 1959 and in
every year since, imports of steel mill products have exceeded
exports . . . Much of the steel imported from foreign countries into
this country has been sold at prices substantially below those
prevailing both in their own domestic markets and in the U.S.
markets" [p. 37].
1967 — "Prices of foreign steel sold in the United States are substantially
below U.S. domestic prices. Limited data available indicate that
price differences arise primarily because of the large cost advantage — principally employment costs — enjoyed by foreign steelmakers [p. 18] . . . Many foreign producers have an added advantage because the installed costs of new facilities abroad are far less
than in the United States. (Due to pollution control equipment
requirements) [p. 20] . . . U.S. import vulnerability inceases when
and where low foreign wages are accompanied by productive
capability and capital availability" [p. 35].
1978 — "Many of these imports were dumped here at . . . prices below
their costs, or below what they sell the same products for in their
own countries. Dumping hurts the domestic steel industry and the
American economy through lost jobs, sales and profits . . . Today,
the U.S. is the only industrialized nation unable to supply its own
steel needs. If solutions are not found, we will become even more
dependent on foreign sources of supply" [p. 6].
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Summary
U.S. Steel was unable to find any workable solution to the wage-price
squeeze on profits. This, coupled with the fact that their capital base was
deteriorating, caused the company to become increasingly noncompetitive in
the international market. After several decades of warnings, U.S. Steel finally
in the early 1980s began to search for alternative investments.
1984 — "A New U.S. Steel came into its own in 1984 . . . Today our Oil and
Gas segment is now our major line of business in terms of both
revenues and earnings" [p. 2].
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